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                                                              -*- outline -*-

* src/base64                                                  
** Make parsing more robust
   Currently we don't cope with overlong lines in the best way.
** Check that we really release the ksba reader/writer objects.

* sm/call-agent.c
** Some code should go into import.c
** When we allow concurrent service request in gpgsm, we
   might want to have an agent context for each service request
   (i.e. Assuan context).

* sm/certchain.c
** Try to keep certificate references somewhere
  This will help with some of our caching code.  We also need to test
  that caching; in particular "regtp_ca_chainlen".

* sm/decrypt.c
** replace leading zero in integer hack by a cleaner solution

* sm/gpgsm.c
** Implement --default-key
** support the anyPolicy semantic
** Should we prefer nonRepudiation certs over plain signing certs?
   Also: Do we need a way to allow the selection of a qualSig cert
   over a plain one?  The background is that the Telesec cards have 3
   certs capable of signing all with the same subject name.

* sm/keydb.c
** Check file permissions
** Check that all error code mapping is done.
** Remove the inter-module dependencies between gpgsm and keybox
** Add an source_of_key field

* agent/
** If we detect that a private key has been deleted
   Bump the key event counter.

* agent/command.c
** Make sure that secure memory is used where appropriate

* agent/pkdecrypt.c, agent/pksign.c
** Support DSA

* Move pkcs-1 encoding into libgcrypt.

* Use a MAC to protect sensitive files.
  The problem here is that we need yet another key and it is unlikely
  that users are willing to remember that key too.  It is possible to
  do this with a smartcard, though.

* sm/export.c
** Return an error code or a status info per user ID.

* common/tlv.c
  The parse_sexp function should not go into this file.  Check whether
  we can change all S-expression handling code to make use of this
  function.

* scd
** Application context vs. reader slot
  We have 2 concurrent method of tracking whether a reader is in use:
  Using the session_list in command.c and the lock_table in app.c.  It
  would be better to do this just at one place. First we need to see
  how we can support cards with multiple applications.
** Resolve fixme in do_sign of app-dinsig.
** Disconnect 
  Card timeout is currently used as a boolean.  
  Add disconnect support for the ccid driver.

* Regression tests
** Add a regression test to check the extkeyusage.

* Windows port (W32)
** Regex support is disabled
  We need to adjust the test to find the regex we have anyway in 
  gpg4win.  Is that regex compatible to the OpenPGP requirement?


* sm/
** check that we issue NO_SECKEY xxx if a -u key was not found
   We don't. The messages returned are also wrong (recipient vs. signer).

* g10/
** issue a NO_SECKEY xxxx if a -u key was not found.

* Extend selinux support to other modules
  See also http://etbe.coker.com.au/2008/06/06/se-linux-support-gpg/

* UTF-8 specific TODOs
  None.

* Manual
** Document all gpgsm options.
   

* Pinpad Reader
  We do not yet support P15 applications.  The trivial thing using
  ASCII characters will be easy to implement but the other cases need
  some more work.

* Bugs


* Howtos
** Migrate OpenPGP keys to another system

* Gpg-Agent Locale
  Although we pass LC_MESSAGE from gpgsm et al. to Pinentry, this has
  only an effect on the stock GTK strings (e.g. "OK") and not on any
  strings gpg-agent generates and passes to Pinentry.  This defeats
  our design goal to allow changing the locale without changing
  gpg-agent's default locale (e.g. by the command updatestartuptty).

* RFC 4387: Operational Protocols: Certificate Store Access via HTTP
  Do we support this?


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